Rachael Mulheron教授主旨发言
Third Party Funding in England and Wales: Learning from the Past, and Looking to the Future
英国的第三方资助：从过去看未来
Thank you for this very kind invitation to present at this International Conference on Third Party Funding, it is a very great honour to be invited to speak to you today about Third Party Funding in England and Wales. Thank you also to my hosts, Houzhu Capital, who have made me feel so very welcome in your beautiful city of Beijing.
I have called this presentation, ‘Learning from the Past, and Looking to the Future’, because although England has a sophisticated and established third party funding industry for both litigation and for commercial arbitrations, we do not have all the answers!! In fact, we still have some important questions to answer as to ‘best practice’ of third party funding.
So what I will present to you today is an outline of how third party funding operates in England and Wales, and the sorts of issues which we, as a jurisdiction, confront, looking to the future.
非常感谢您们邀请我在这次第三方资助国际会议上发言，今天能在此与您们讨论英格兰和威尔士的第三方资助，我感到非常荣幸。我也要感谢我的主办方厚助资本，他们让我在您们美丽的北京城市中感到非常受欢迎。
我将这次演讲命名为《从过去学习，展望未来》，因为虽然英格兰拥有一个成熟且已被认可的第三方资助行业，无论是诉讼还是商业仲裁方面，但我们并没有所有的答案！实际上，我们仍然需要回答一些关于第三方资助“最佳实践”的重要问题。
因此，今天我要向您们介绍的是第三方资助在英格兰和威尔士的运作方式，以及我们作为一个司法管辖区在展望未来时所面临的各种问题。
In fact, this year, 2024, marks 30 years since when the House of Lords approved of the concept of third party funding as an acceptable part of English law. Prior that, trade associations, recreational groups, and trade unions had financed their members’ litigation – but in the case of Giles v Thompson [1994]1 AC 142 (HL), the House of Lords approved of a stranger financing another’s litigation for reward.
In Giles, the funder was a garage owner who was repairing cars which had been involved in car accidents. The garage owner had no relationship with those motorists whose cars he was fixing, they were strangers to him. But he agreed to fund each motorist’s legal action against the defendant car owner, and in return, he would obtain payment of the hiring costs of replacement vehicles out of any judgment or settlement obtained against the defendant motorist. Lord Mustill could see nothing wrong with that:
‘The garage owner agrees to finance the action, which he believes certain to succeed, leaving the motorist to employ her own lawyers at the garage owner’s expense… I am quite unable to see how it could be said that the car rental agreement is [unlawful or against public policy]. There is no “wanton and officious intermeddling” in the dispute between the motorist and the defendant. The garage owner does not meddle at all, but allows the motorist to get on with the claim, and merely awaits a favourable result.’
That was the first House of Lords endorsement of third party funding in England, 30 years ago – and it has come a long way since!
实际上，2024年标志着第三方资助作为英格兰法律中可接受的一部分，获得英国上议院批准的30周年。在此之前，贸易协会、休闲团体和工会已经为其成员的诉讼提供资助——但在Giles v Thompson [1994] AC 142 (HL)一案中，上议院批准了一位陌生人资助他人以获报酬的诉讼。
在Giles案中，资助者是一个车库老板，他修理了涉及交通事故的汽车。车库老板与那些修车的汽车驾驶员并无关系，他们是他的陌生人。但他同意资助每个驾驶员对被告肇事车主的法律诉讼，作为回报，他将从被告车主的判决或和解支付中获得车辆替代费用的付款。穆斯蒂尔勋爵认为这没有任何问题：
“车库老板同意资助他认为肯定能赢的诉讼，让驾驶员以车库老板的费用聘请她自己的律师……我完全看不出车租协议如何能被视为[非法或违反公共政策]。这不是对驾驶员与被告之间争端的‘无理干涉’。车库老板根本没有干涉，只是让驾驶员继续诉讼，并等待有利的结果。”
这就是30年前英国上议院首次批准英格兰的第三方资助——自那以后，资助行业已经取得了长足的发展！
I will now divide this presentation into five parts.
The first will introduce third party funding as a concept in England.
The second will outline the typical business model of a funder which operates in England.
The third part will explore some issues associated with the funder’s success fee – that’s the upside for the funder.
The fourth part of the presentation will explore the potential downsides for the funder who is involved in another’s litigation.
Finally, the fifth part looks at important protections which English law insists upon for the funded client. After all, it is that client who is giving up some of its damages or arbitral award to a funder, if successful – and that requires, as a quid pro quo, that some safeguards are put in place for that funded client.
我将把这次演讲分为五个部分。
第一个部分将介绍第三方资助在英格兰的概念。
第二个部分将概述英格兰资助方的典型商业模式。
第三部分将探讨与资助方收益相关的问题——即资助方的收益。
第四部分将探讨资助方参与他人诉讼时可能面临的潜在不利因素。
第五部分探讨了英国法律为被资助的客户规定的重要保护措施。毕竟，如果被资助的客户成功了，他们将不得不放弃一部分赔偿金或仲裁裁决给资助方——这要求作为交换，被资助的客户需要得到一些保障。
Over its past 30 years in England, third party funding has become a complex and sophisticated industry. There are over 20 funders operating in England now. In addition, there are litigation brokers who put funders in touch with claimants who require financing; and law firms also take a key role in arranging the funding for their clients’ disputes. It is a complex landscape.
Third party funding is used in England to support both litigation (especially commercial and class actions litigation) – and it also commonly supports arbitrations which are seated in London.
But not only that. Many of the 20+ funders that I mentioned previously fund international litigation, and also arbitrations which are seated in other jurisdictions around the world.
在过去的30年里，英格兰的第三方资助已发展为一个复杂且成熟的行业。现在英格兰有超过20家资助方在运营。此外，还有诉讼经纪人，他们将资助方与需要资助的索赔人联系起来；律师事务所也在为客户的纠纷安排资助方面发挥关键作用。这是一个复杂的格局。
第三方资助在英格兰不仅用于支持诉讼（尤其是商业和集体诉讼），还广泛用于在伦敦进行的仲裁。
不仅如此，我之前提到的20多家资助方中的许多还为国际诉讼提供资助，并且支持在世界其他司法管辖区进行的仲裁。
This slide sets out the key players in a piece of funded litigation or arbitration in England.
The contract between the claimant, the funded client, and the funder, is called the ‘litigation funding agreement’, or ‘LFA’. As a general rule, the fact that the claimant is being funded by a funder does not have to be disclosed to a defendant. The main exception to that rule is in the case of the statutory class action regime in England. Where this operates in the narrow field of competition law, the fact that the class representative is being third party funded is disclosed to the defendant and to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Otherwise, typically, the fact that the litigation or arbitration is being third party funded; the identity of the funder; and the terms of the LFA do not need to be disclosed to the opponent.
Also in this landscape is the ATE insurer, or ‘after-the-event’ insurer. This party may have an arrangement with the funder, or with the funded client directly, to cover the client’s adverse costs, should the client lose its case. If the client loses, it could be very expensive, because usually ‘costs follow the event’ in English litigation and arbitrations. In other words, a winning defendant is entitled to its costs from the losing claimant. Hence, an ATE insurer may be involved to cover the prospect of those adverse costs – and the third party funder typically pays the insurance premium for that insurance on behalf of the funded client.
本幻灯片列出了在英格兰资助的诉讼或仲裁中关键的参与者。
原告、被资助客户与资助方之间的合同称为“诉讼资助协议”或“LFA”。通常来说，原告由资助方资助的事实不需要向被告披露。此规则的主要例外情况是在英格兰的法定集体诉讼制度中。在这个狭窄的竞争法领域中，集体代表接受第三方资助的事实需要向被告和竞争上诉法庭披露。除此之外，通常不需要向对方披露诉讼或仲裁是由第三方资助的；资助方的身份以及LFA的条款也不需要披露。
此外，在这个格局中还包括ATE保险人，即“事后保险”保险人。这一方可能与资助方或直接与被资助客户达成协议，以便在客户败诉时支付客户的败诉费用。如果客户败诉，这可能会非常昂贵，因为通常在英格兰的诉讼和仲裁中，诉讼费用由败诉方承担。换句话说，胜诉的被告有权要求败诉的原告支付诉讼费用。因此，ATE保险人可能会参与其中，以应对这些潜在的败诉费用——而第三方资助方通常会代表被资助客户支付该保险的保费。
In this slide, I set out the key characteristics of third party funding in England.
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The funder is a commercial entity who views litigation as a form of investment – in England, its funding often provides the only realistic means of access to justice, or getting the case to a court or an arbitral tribunal. This is especially true in the class actions context, for those actions are very expensive to run, and other methods of funding are generally not available;
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The funder has no pre-existing interest in the dispute between the claimant and the defendant, the funder is a true stranger to their litigation;
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The funder will fund all or part of the claimant’s costs, which we call ‘own side’ costs – the funder may or may not agree to fund adverse costs, should the claimant lose (which I’ll come to later);
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Third party funding is called ‘non-recourse’ funding in England, because if the claimant loses, there is no requirement to pay the funder back – it is not a loan. The funder is only entitled to payment if ‘success’ is achieved. That could be a settlement, a judgment, an arbitral award, or even a costs order in the funded client’s favour;
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The funder’s return or profit of its investment is crucial – that is always the aim, to fund a winning case and hence, make some return!
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As already mentioned, an ATE insurer is often involved in the funding package too, to cover adverse costs, should the claimant lose the case.
本幻灯片列出了英格兰第三方资助的主要特征。
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资助方是一个商业实体，他们将诉讼视为一种投资——在英格兰，他们的资助往往是唯一能让案件进入法庭或仲裁庭的现实手段。在集体诉讼的背景下尤其如此，因为这些诉讼的费用非常高，通常无法使用其他资助方法；
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资助方与原告和被告之间的争议没有事先的利益关系，资助方是真正与诉讼无关的第三方；
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资助方将为原告支付全部或部分诉讼费用，我们称之为“己方费用”——资助方可能会或可能不会同意支付败诉费用（我稍后会详细说明）；
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第三方资助在英格兰被称为“无追索权”资助，因为如果原告败诉，无需偿还资助方——这不是贷款。只有在取得“成功”时，资助方才有权获得付款。成功可能表现为和解、判决、仲裁裁决，甚至是原告胜诉的费用裁决；
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资助方的回报或投资利润是至关重要的——他们的目标总是资助一个有可能胜诉的案件，从而获得一些回报！
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如前所述，ATE保险人通常也参与资助计划，以应对原告败诉时的败诉费用风险。
In England, we do not have the statutory regulation of funders. It is a form of self-regulation which we adopt in England. In 2011, the Association of Litigation Funders was formed, called the ‘ALF’. This body is made up of various funders, and it also regulates funders who are members. This regulation is made up of two key components.
The first and most important is that all funders who are members of the ALF must abide by the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders. That Code was developed in 2011, and has been reviewed regularly since, to keep it up-to-date. This Code requires, for example, that funders maintain a minimum capital adequacy, and also that they are audited annually.
The second component of the regulation is that the ALF has a system of managing any complaints which are made against a funder by a funded client. Thus far, since 2011, there have only been four such complaints made.
Not all of the funders operating in England are members of the ALF. Presently, 16 funders are members, but others are not.
The question of whether the oversight of third party funding should be tightened by a more formal statutory regulation of funders is currently under law reform consideration in England. But for now, the ALF and its Code of Conduct apply.
NOW I TURN TO THE SECOND PART OF THE PRESENTATION, THE FUNDER’S TYPICAL BUSINESS MODEL:
在英格兰，我们没有对资助方的法定监管。在英格兰，我们采取的是一种自我监管的形式。2011年，诉讼资助者协会（ALF）成立。这一机构由各个资助方组成，同时也监管其成员资助方。该监管有两个主要组成部分。
首先也是最重要的一点是，所有ALF成员资助方必须遵守《诉讼资助方行为守则》。该守则于2011年制定，并自那时起定期审查，以保持其与时俱进。该守则要求资助方例如必须保持最低的资本充足性，并且每年都要进行审计。
监管的第二个组成部分是ALF有一个处理被资助客户对资助方提出投诉的系统。自2011年以来，只有四起这样的投诉。
并非所有在英格兰运营的资助方都是ALF的成员。目前有16家资助方是ALF的成员，但也有一些不是。
目前，是否应该通过更正式的法定监管来加强对第三方资助的监督，正在英格兰进行法律改革的讨论。但目前，ALF及其行为守则适用。
现在我将转向演讲的第二部分：资助方的典型商业模式
As I’ve already mentioned, funders will cover all or part of the claimant’s own side costs. They will cover everything that I’ve put on this slide:
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Court filing fees, or if it is an arbitration, the claimant’s share of the arbitrator’s fees and arbitration venue costs;
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Any expert witness fees, as their reports can be very expensive!
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The lawyers’ fees – both the law firm’s and the barrister’s (the legal profession being a divided profession in England, divided into solicitors and barristers – the fees of both are covered by a third party funder);
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Any court transcript fees or witnesses’ travelling costs; and
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As I mentioned earlier, if an ATE insurer is covering the risk of adverse costs, then the insurance premium will be covered by the third party funder.
正如我之前提到的，资助方将支付原告的全部或部分己方费用。他们将支付我在幻灯片上列出的所有费用：
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法庭文件费，或如果是仲裁，则支付原告应分担的仲裁员费用和仲裁场地费用；
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任何专家证人费用，因为他们的报告费用可能非常昂贵！
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律师费用——包括律师事务所和大律师的费用（在英格兰，法律职业分为律师和大律师，第三方资助将覆盖这两者的费用）；
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任何法庭记录费用或证人差旅费用；
- 以及如前所述，如果ATE保险人为败诉费用提供保险，则保险费将由第三方资助方承担。
There are four criteria which funders in England apply to the cases that are pitched to them:
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First of all, they have to be strong cases that are brought to them. Typically, a merits assessment of 60% or higher is applied. There has to be a ‘better than evens’ prospect of winning the case;
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Secondly, the claim value itself must be between 3x and 10x the costs which the funder invests in the case. That’s known as the costs to claim ratio which funders in England apply;
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Thirdly, English funders don’t typically fund any claim under £3M, and some don’t fund any claim value under £10M;
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Fourthly, English funders insist on good enforceability of a judgment. So, the defendant being sued must have the capacity to pay any judgment or settlement or arbitral award; and the judgment or arbitral award must be capable of being recognized and enforced.
英格兰的资助方对向他们提出的案件应用四个标准：
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首先，必须是强有力的案件。通常，他们要求案件有60%或更高的胜诉可能性。案件必须有“大于一半”的胜诉机会； -
其次，索赔金额本身必须是资助方投入成本的3到10倍。这就是英格兰资助方所应用的费用与索赔比例； -
第三，英格兰的资助方通常不会为低于300万英镑的索赔提供资助，有些资助方不资助低于1000万英镑的索赔；
- 第四，英格兰资助方要求判决具有良好的可执行性。因此，所起诉的被告必须有能力支付任何判决、和解或仲裁裁决，并且判决或仲裁裁决必须能够得到承认和执行。
So, all of this means that English funders fund between only 2% and 10% of all cases pitched to them! This was one of the really interesting findings to come out of my recent doctrinal and empirical study of third party funding and England and Wales. It is a very low rate of acceptance under their business models!
所有这些意味着英格兰资助方只资助他们所接触的2%到10%的案件！这是我最近对英格兰和威尔士第三方资助进行的理论和实证研究中的一个非常有趣的发现。根据他们的商业模式，接受率非常低。
NOW I TURN TO THE THIRD PART OF THE PRESENTATION, ISSUES AROUND THE FUNDER’S SUCCESS FEE:
In English law, and with very rare exception which I’ll come to later, the funder’s success fee comes out of the funded client’s damages or arbitral award.
Until July 2023, funders calculated their success fee via two possible methods:
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As a percentage of whatever the funded client recovered from the defendant, say, 30%; or
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As a multiple of the costs which the funder either committed to the case, or actually spent, say, 4 x what it cost to fund the case to success.
Why July 2023 is important, I’ll come to soon!
Actually speaking, my empirical study showed that there was a fairly large range of numbers for both the percentage and the multiple methods.
Percentages tended to range between 10-50% of whatever amount is recovered from the defendant; and multiples tended to range from just half of what the funder spent on the case, to 14 times what the funder spent on the case! And everything in between.
Also, the LFA between the funder and the client typically will state that the funder is entitled to the greater of the percentage method or the multiple method. A formula for each will be in the LFA, and the funder is entitled to whichever turns out to the higher.
根据英格兰法律，除了我稍后会提到的极少数例外情况，资助方的收益通常来自被资助客户从被告那里获得的赔偿金或仲裁裁决。
直到2023年7月，资助方通过两种可能的方法来计算他们的收益：
作为被资助客户从被告处获得的赔偿金的一个百分比，例如30%；或
作为资助方承诺投入或实际上投入的费用的倍数，例如资助费用的4倍。
为什么2023年7月如此重要，我很快就会解释！
事实上，我的实证研究表明，这两种方法的数值范围都相当大。
百分比法通常在10%到50%之间，而倍数法则从资助费用的0.5倍到14倍不等！还有很多介于这两者之间的情况。
此外，LFA（诉讼资助协议）通常会规定资助方有权按照百分比法或倍数法中数值较高的一种方法获得报酬。LFA中会包含每种方法的公式，资助方有权获得两者中更高的那一项。
A question inevitably arises when it comes to the funder’s success fee – should that reward, that success fee, be capped? Should there be some upper limit on what the funder can take from the funded client’s damages?
Presently, there is no cap on a funder’s success fee in English law. In the case of Golden Eye v Telefonica UK mentioned on the slide, the success fee was 75% -- and the court there allowed it, although it called the success fee ‘a handsome return’ for the funder!
But you can envisage a situation whereby, if the success fee is not capped, that success fee might consume all of the judgment, settlement or arbitral award. Especially where a multiple of costs is used, the entirety of a judgment may be paid towards the funder’s success fee – not a mere 65%, but much higher could be possible.
The pros and the cons of insisting on a cap are being much debated in England at present. There are certainly arguments in favour of a cap, and against one.
在谈到资助方的收益时，一个不可避免的问题是：这种收益是否应该被设定上限？是否应该对资助方从被资助客户的赔偿中提取的部分设定某种上限？
目前，英格兰法律并没有对资助方的收益设定上限。在幻灯片中提到的Golden Eye v Telefonica UK案件中，资助方的收益高达75%——法院虽然称其为“相当丰厚的回报”，但仍然允许了这一比例。
但是您可以设想，如果不设定收益上限，资助方的收益可能会消耗掉判决、和解或仲裁裁决的全部金额。特别是使用成本倍数法时，整个判决可能全部用于支付资助方的收益，因为资助方收益不仅仅是65%，甚至可能更高。
在英格兰，是否应该设定收益上限，目前正在进行激烈的辩论。支持和反对上限的理由都有。
This brings me to what ‘success’ to a funder actually means, when it comes to third party funding. Success has two possible meanings in third party funding:
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The first is ‘outward looking success’ – this is where the funded client wins their arbitration or court case, or achieves a settlement, and is entitled to their success fee. The trigger for success has been met! That is a winning case for them, to outward eyes;
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BUT: in reality, that success fee paid to a funder may have been totally consumed by the costs which the funder invested to win the case. It may have cost the funder more to fund the case than the funded client actually recovers. That is a losing case for a funder. As one funder said to me during the course of my empirical study, ‘a successful case to us is making one more penny than we spent on it’. That’s inward-looking success!
That is why third party funders typically do not like the notion of caps on the success fee. Their argument is that a case may be commercially unviable to fund, if the success fee was capped at 50%, as it would cost them more than that to fund it, so that it would be an inwardly unsuccessful case, and they won’t fund losing propositions. That would be a bad investment.
这让我来解释在第三方资助中，资助方所说的“成功”到底意味着什么。成功在第三方资助中有两种可能的含义：
- 第一种是“外在成功”——这是指被资助客户赢得了仲裁或诉讼，或达成了和解，因此资助方有权获得他们的收益。成功的触发条件已经满足！这是从外部来看是成功的案件；
- 但实际上，资助方的收益可能完全被他们投入的成本所吞噬。资助方可能为赢得案件付出的成本比被资助客户实际获得的赔偿还要多。这对资助方来说是一个失败的案件。正如我在研究中与一位资助方交流时，他说：“对我们来说，我们赚到的比我们花掉的哪怕多一分钱就算是成功的案件。”这就是“内在成功”！
这就是为什么资助方通常不喜欢设定收益上限。他们的论点是，如果收益上限设定为50%，那么资助方的资助成本可能超过这一金额，导致案件从内部来看是失败的，资助方不会资助失败的项目。这对他们来说将是一个糟糕的投资。
One issue about the funder’s success fee that is really rather controversial in England is whether that fee can be recovered from a losing defendant. After all, what a big difference to the funded client that would make! The funded client would not have to lose some of its damages to the funder; the funded client could keep all of its damages, and the defendant would have to pay the funder’s success fee.
In English litigation, the recovery of a funder’s success fee from the defendant has never been allowed.
But in English-seated arbitration, it has been allowed at least twice – and I’ve noted the two cases on the slide, Essar and Tenke. In Essar, the court allowed the funder’s success fee to be recovered from the opponent in the arbitration because the defendant’s behavior was considered to be very poor; whereas in Tenke, the reason was quite different: it was reasonable for the funded client to have used third party funding, and the success fee was not unreasonable.
In my report, it was suggested that the right of a funder to recover its success fee from a defendant should be extended to litigation, and that it should occur more frequently in arbitration. It was also suggested that this should be possible only where an LFA was disclosed early to the defendant, so that the defendant knew that it could be ‘on the hook’ for that success fee.
This point about recovery of a funder’s success fee remains quite controversial in English law.
关于资助方收益的另一个相当有争议的问题是：这种收益是否可以从败诉的被告那里获得。毕竟，这将对被资助客户产生重大影响！被资助客户不需要失去部分赔偿金，所有的赔偿金都可以归他们所有，而由被告支付资助方的收益。
在英格兰的诉讼中，资助方的收益从未被允许由被告支付。
但在以英格兰为仲裁地的仲裁中，至少有两次允许了这种情况——我在幻灯片上列出了这两个案件，分别是Essar和Tenke。在Essar案中，法院允许资助方从仲裁对手那里获得收益，因为被告的行为被认为非常恶劣；而在Tenke案中，原因则完全不同：资助客户使用第三方资助是合理的，资助方的收益也不算过分。
在我的报告中，建议将资助方从被告处收回收益的权利扩大到诉讼中，并建议在仲裁中更频繁地允许这种做法。还建议，只有在LFA（诉讼资助协议）早期向被告披露的情况下，资助方的收益才应由被告承担，以便被告知道他们可能需要承担这一费用。
这一点在英格兰法律中仍然存在很大的争议。
Now we come to what I’ve called the ‘Paccar problem’! Paccar was a judgment which was handed down by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2023. It has caused a lot of turmoil in the English third party funding market ever since!
The problem arose because of the distinction between two types of agreement. On the one hand are the LFAs, the litigation funding agreements, which funders enter into with their funded client. On the other hand are ‘damages-based agreements’, or DBAs. These are contingency fee agreements which lawyers can enter into with their client, and are calculated as percentage contingency fee agreements. These DBAs have very strict drafting requirements. They operate somewhat differently from LFAs too, in that not all the costs are within the lawyer’s success fee – a client may have to pay some costs on top of the lawyer’s success fee. Whereas you will remember that all of the costs of funding the case are covered by the funder’s success fee, that is all that the funded client pays to the funder – just the success fee, not success fee + costs.
Well, in July 2023, the Supreme Court decreed that LFAs were actually also DBAs, where the funder’s success fee was calculated as a percentage of the amount recovered by the client. And hence, this meant that all percentage-of-recovery LFAs had to comply with the DBA legislation, or else, if they did not (and none did up to that point!), they were unlawful. What’s more, those retrospective LFAs which did not comply with the DBA legislation were, and always had been, unlawful!!
This decision meant that LFAs up and down the country were generally invalid, and that they had to be quickly redrafted and re-negotiated. The point is that it is generally considered that LFAs cannot be drafted so as to comply with the DBA legislation. The DBA legislation was never drafted with third party funders in mind, it had been directed at the time to lawyers’ funding, but the Supreme Court interpreted the relevant legislation to be wide enough so as to include third party funders.
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision, thoughts turned to reversing the Paccar decision by legislation, so as to provide that LFAs were not DBAs, and that LFAs did not have to comply with the onerous DBA legislation. There were two tacks for achieving this, and one of these tacks was adopted and drafted for in the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill 2024. I was involved in this drafting, and can only say that reversing Paccar via legislation was a tricky exercise in drafting!!!
This Bill was introduced into Parliament in March 2024. It was introduced into the House of Lords, and made its way to the Second Reading Committee Stage. Then, the then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak called the General Election in May. At that point, the Bill lapsed, as it did not have time to carry through the House of Commons, during the mere week of that Parliament that was left.
A different (Labour) government was returned at the General Election in May, and thus far, there has been no sign of that reversal Bill being re-introduced by the new government.
现在我们来谈谈我所谓的“Paccar问题”！Paccar是英国最高法院在2023年做出的一个判决，自那以后给英格兰的第三方资助市场带来了很大的动荡！
问题的根源在于两种协议之间的区别。一种是LFAs（诉讼资助协议），即资助方与其被资助客户签订的协议。另一种是“基于赔偿的协议”（DBA），这些是律师可以与客户签订的按百分比计算的风险代理协议。这些DBA的起草要求非常严格。它们与LFAs的运作方式也有所不同，因为并非所有费用都包含在律师的收益中——客户可能还需要支付一些律师费用，而律师的收益不包含在内。相比之下，您可能还记得，所有资助案件的费用都包含在资助方的收益中，客户只需要支付收益，而不是收益加费用。
在2023年7月，最高法院裁定，如果资助方的收益是按客户回收金额的百分比计算的，那么LFAs实际上也是DBAs。因此，这意味着所有按百分比计算收益的LFAs必须符合DBA的法律规定，否则如果它们不符合规定（实际上在判决前没有一个是符合规定的！），它们将是非法的。更重要的是，那些不符合DBA规定的以往LFAs自始至终都是非法的！！
这项裁决意味着英国各地的LFAs普遍无效，必须迅速重新起草和重新协商。问题在于，通常认为LFAs无法符合DBA立法的要求。DBA立法最初并未针对第三方资助方起草，而是针对律师资助的，但最高法院将相关立法解释得足够宽泛，以包括第三方资助方。
在最高法院做出裁决后，人们立即开始考虑通过立法来推翻Paccar的决定，从而规定LFAs不是DBAs，也不需要遵守DBA立法的苛刻规定。有两种方式可以实现这一目标，其中一种被采用并起草为《诉讼资助协议（可执行性）法案2024》。我参与了这项起草工作，我只能说，通过立法推翻Paccar的决定是一个复杂的起草过程！
这项法案于2024年3月提交至议会，先是提交给上议院，并通过了二读阶段。然而，当时的首相里希·苏纳克于5月宣布了大选。在那时，法案因为议会只剩一周时间，无法通过下议院审议而失效。
在5月的大选中，新一届（工党）政府上台，但迄今为止，还没有迹象表明新政府会重新引入这项推翻Paccar决定的法案。
Because of Paccar, what funders had to do virtually overnight was to pivot, or redraft, their LFAs to multiple-of-costs DBAs. In other words, if their success fee was a percentage-of-recovery model, then they had to hastily change that to a multiple-of-costs success fee – if their funded client was prepared to let them do that!
However, even LFAs which use the multiples of costs formula are presently under appeal to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. It has been argued that multiple-of-costs LFAs are also DBAs. Now, if that appeal is heard and the court decides that multiples are DBAs, then the industry is in serious trouble in England. If that were to happen, it would surely prompt a reversal Bill very quickly, to save the entire industry.
Of course, all of this has huge ramifications, for commercial litigation and for the class action regime in England. Much of that litigation is third party funded, and could not be funded without it!
NOW I TURN TO THE FOURTH PART OF THE PRESENTATION – WHAT ARE THE DOWNSIDES FOR A THIRD PARTY FUNDER?
由于Paccar的裁决，资助方几乎在一夜之间不得不调整或重新起草其LFAs，将收益计算方法改为“成本倍数”的DBAs。换句话说，如果他们的收益模式是按回收金额的百分比计算的，那么他们必须迅速将其改为按成本倍数计算收益——前提是他们的被资助客户愿意让他们这样做！
然而，即便是使用成本倍数公式的LFAs，当前也正在向英格兰和威尔士上诉法院提出上诉。有人认为，按成本倍数计算的LFAs也是DBAs。如果这一上诉被接受，法院裁定成本倍数LFAs也是DBAs，那么英格兰的这一行业将陷入严重危机。如果这种情况发生，势必会迅速推动通过一项法案来挽救整个行业。
当然，所有这一切都对商业诉讼和英格兰的集体诉讼制度有着巨大的影响。许多此类诉讼都依赖于第三方资助，且没有这些资助就无法进行！
现在我转向演讲的第四部分——资助方可能面临的风险：
As mentioned earlier, ‘costs follow the event’ in most English litigation and arbitration. So, if the funded client loses, a fairly large adverse costs bill can arise for payment!
The claimant will seek to avoid that burden, and to shift that burden to the third party funder, in one of two ways.
First, the LFA between the funder and the funded client may state that the funder or an ATE insurer will pay the adverse costs, should they arise. If the funder does take on that risk, then the success fee will inevitably be higher.
Secondly, a court may order that the funder pay the adverse costs of a winning defendant, in what is called, in English law, a non-party costs order. That is possible, even where the LFA does not provide for that. The court can order it! And in English law, third party funders generally assume that, in the event that their funded client loses the case, the funder will be liable for some amount of adverse costs.
如前所述，在大多数英格兰的诉讼和仲裁中，败诉方通常要承担费用。因此，如果被资助客户败诉，可能会产生相当大的败诉费用！
原告会寻求避免这一负担，并通过两种方式将这一负担转移给第三方资助方。
首先，资助方和被资助客户之间的LFA可能规定，如果败诉发生，资助方或ATE保险方将承担败诉费用。如果资助方承担了这一风险，那么其收益无疑会更高。
其次，法院可能会下令资助方支付胜诉被告的败诉费用，这在英格兰法律中被称为非当事人费用令。这种情况即使在LFA中没有规定，法院也可以下令！在英格兰法律中，资助方通常假定如果其被资助客户败诉，资助方将对某些败诉费用负有责任。
But what of other potential downsides for the third party funder? In fact, there are a number of questions which are still quite uncertain, quite undecided, in English law. I have listed a number of examples on this slide. For example:
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Suppose that a funder invests £10M into funding a case, and the funded client loses. The adverse costs to which the winning defendant is entitled is £15M. Should the funder’s adverse costs be capped at that £10M? That position was endorsed by the English Court of Appeal in Arkin v Borchard Lines for litigation. Should it also apply to arbitrations? Is that even fair to a defendant, who loses the right to recover £5M in adverse costs?
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For commercial arbitrations seated in England, a Bill is going through the United Kingdom Parliament at the moment, the Arbitration Bill 2024, which provides that a court should be able to make a non-party costs order against a third party funder who was involved on the losing side of an arbitration. That sort of order would be discretionary, it would depend upon a case-by-case analysis of the arbitration by a court, but cl 9(2) provides for that possibility of a non-party costs order against a funder who funds an unsuccessful arbitration;
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However, the Bill does not permit an arbitrator to make that sort of non-party costs order against a third party funder in an arbitration – only a court could make that order. Some English lawyers think that arbitrators should have that statutory power, but the Bill does not presently allow it;
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Finally, I’ve mentioned previously that, in most cases, the fact, the identity, and the terms of any LFA that the claimant may have entered into with a third party funder do not have to be disclosed to the defendant, in either litigation or arbitration. Class actions are the exception to that. But should that position be reversed? Should disclosure be automatically required? Again, this is a question of real controversy in English law.
When it comes to the potential downsides of third party funding in English law, there still remain some very important questions where reasonable opinion differs.
NOW I TURN TO THE FIFTH AND FINAL PART OF THE PRESENTATION, ISSUES AROUND THE FUNDER’S SUCCESS FEE:
那么，第三方资助方可能面临的其他潜在风险是什么呢？实际上，英格兰法律中仍然存在一些尚未确定、不明确的问题。我在幻灯片中列出了一些例子。例如：
- 假设资助方向一个案件投资了1000万英镑，但被资助客户败诉。胜诉被告有权获得1500万英镑的败诉费用。资助方的败诉费用是否应上限为1000万英镑？这一立场在英格兰上诉法院的Arkin v Borchard Lines案件中得到认可，适用于诉讼。那么，它是否也应该适用于仲裁？对被告来说，这是否公平，毕竟他们失去了500万英镑的败诉费用？
- 目前，英国议会正在通过一项《仲裁法案2024》，该法案规定法院可以对资助败诉方的仲裁案中的第三方资助方下达非当事人费用令。这种命令是可酌情决定的，取决于法院对仲裁案的具体分析，但第9(2)条规定了对资助败诉方的仲裁案中的资助方下达这种命令的可能性；
- 然而，该法案不允许仲裁员对第三方资助方下达这种非当事人费用令——只有法院可以下达此类命令。一些英格兰律师认为仲裁员应具有这一法定权力，但目前法案并未允许这一点；
- 最后，我之前提到，在大多数案件中，原告与第三方资助方签订的LFA的事实、资助方的身份及其条款通常不需要披露给被告，无论是在诉讼还是仲裁中。集体诉讼是个例外。但这种情况是否应该反转？是否应自动要求披露？这也是英格兰法律中的一个争议点。
当涉及到英格兰法律中的第三方资助潜在风险时，仍然存在一些非常重要的问题，不同的意见之间存在合理的分歧。
现在我转向演讲的第五部分——对被资助客户的保护措施：
Given that the funded client stands to lose a considerable chunk of its judgment award, settlement sum, or arbitral award to a third party funder where that form of funding is used, English law has always been keen to ensure that the funded client is safeguarded.
These are stipulated in case law, but are also reflected in the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders. I have mentioned a number of them on the slide:
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The funded client must receive independent advice about the terms of the LFA before the funded client signs that agreement;
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There are only three grounds upon which a funder can withdraw itself from a funding agreement: merits; viability, and material breach. So the client has that safeguard, that a funder cannot just walk away from the litigation without explanation or justification;
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A funder cannot control the conduct or progress of the funded litigation – it remains the client’s claim, not the funder’s! English law treats this as an important public policy point;
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This means that the funder cannot assert an improper control over any part of the litigation, especially settlement negotiations. The client may want to settle and the funder may prefer that the case proceeds. Under a typical LFA, the funder may require that it be consulted, or even that it must consent to the settlement;
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And typically, an LFA will provide that any dispute or any conflict of interest be resolved by an independent KC whose decision will be binding on both parties, the funder and the funded client;
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Finally, for the protection of the funded client, the funder has to have adequate capital behind it. The English Code of Conduct presently stipulates £5M in capital, and the ability for a funder to cover its aggregate liabilities across all of its LFAs for the next 36 months (3 years). Those are minimum thresholds that must be met, although, of course, most funders are capitalized to much higher levels than that.
鉴于被资助客户可能不得不放弃其判决、和解金额或仲裁裁决中的相当大一部分给第三方资助方，英格兰法律一直非常重视确保被资助客户得到保障。
这些保障措施在判例法中有所规定，也反映在《诉讼资助方行为守则》中。我在幻灯片上列出了一些：
- 在签署LFA之前，被资助客户必须就LFA的条款获得独立的法律意见；
- 资助方只有在三个理由下可以撤销资助协议：案件的可行性、案件的合理性和客户的重大违约。因此，客户有保障，资助方不能无故退出诉讼；
- 资助方不能控制诉讼的进程或进行——这仍然是客户的案件，而不是资助方的！英格兰法律将此视为重要的公共政策点；
- 这意味着资助方不能对诉讼的任何部分，特别是和解谈判，进行不正当的控制。客户可能希望和解，而资助方可能更愿意案件继续进行。根据典型的LFA，资助方可能要求被咨询，甚至需要获得同意；
- 通常，LFA会规定任何争议或利益冲突由一名独立的高级律师裁决，其决定对双方都有约束力，即资助方和被资助客户；
- 最后，为了保护被资助客户，资助方必须有足够的资本支持。目前，英格兰的《诉讼资助方行为守则》规定了500万英镑的最低资本要求，并且资助方必须有能力支付其未来36个月内所有LFA的总负债。这是最低标准，当然大多数资助方的资本化水平远高于这一标准。
Presently, it is under review in England as to whether these capital adequacy requirements are sufficient (after all, £5M is not very much in the scheme of a big case!). Even in my empirical study, some funders indicated that £5M was far too low, especially in the climate of class actions. These cases can take upwards of £20M to finance, and so a capital adequacy of £5M seems low.
Also, it is presently under consideration as to whether these capital adequacy requirements should be enacted in statute. A statute would bind all funders, whereas the Code of Conduct only binds those funders who are members of the ALF.
目前，英格兰正在审查这些资本充足性要求是否足够（毕竟，在一个大案件的背景下，500万英镑并不多）。甚至在我的实证研究中，一些资助方表示，500万英镑的标准远远不够，特别是在集体诉讼的环境中。这类案件的融资成本可能高达2000万英镑，因此500万英镑的资本充足性要求显得太低。
目前也正在考虑是否应将这些资本充足性要求写入法律。如果通过立法，这将对所有资助方具有约束力，而行为守则只对ALF的成员资助方具有约束力。
SO, let me conclude with FIVE KEY TAKEAWAYS ABOUT THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN ENGLAND:
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The market is very established and sophisticated, with many funders, brokers and ATE insurers in the market now;
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Third party funding features in both English litigation and arbitration for sure;
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But because of the criteria which funders apply to cases under their business models, not many cases attract the endorsement of funders – remember, 2%-10% of all cases pitched to the funders!
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Wherever third party funding is operating, it is important that a Code of Conduct be implemented, so as to provide a framework for the governance of funding, so that the rules are uniformly known and regarded;
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Finally, to emphasise, whilst England has had much experience of this, we certainly don’t have all the answers! We have learnt from the experiences of others, and hopefully other jurisdictions will learn from us as well, because third party funding is, truly, becoming a global market!
让我用五个关于英格兰第三方资助的关键点作为总结：
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这个市场已经非常成熟且复杂，现有许多资助方、经纪人和ATE保险方参与市场； -
第三方资助在英格兰的诉讼和仲裁中都有出现； -
但是，由于资助方根据其商业模式对案件应用了严格的标准，实际上只有很少的案件能够获得资助方的支持——请记住，只有2%到10%的案件会被资助！ -
无论第三方资助在何处运作，重要的是要实施一套行为守则，以提供资助的治理框架，使规则得到统一的认知和遵守；
- 最后要强调的是，尽管英格兰在这方面有很多经验，但我们当然不是拥有所有答案！我们从他人的经验中学习，也希望其他司法管辖区能从我们的经验中学到东西，因为第三方资助正逐步成为一个全球化的市场！
Thank you so much for your attention during my presentation. I really hope that you have found this useful and relevant to your own work and your own experiences of third party funding.
Thank you again for the honour of the invitation to present today!!!
非常感谢您们在我的演讲期间的耐心倾听！我真诚希望您们认为这些内容对您们自己的工作和您们在第三方资助方面的经验有所帮助和启发。
再次感谢您们给予我今天发言的机会！
Rachael Mulheron
伦敦大学玛丽女王学院法学院的侵权法与民事司法教授，自2004年以来一直在该校任教。自2023年起，她担任竞争上诉法庭的普通（非司法）成员。她的主要学术研究和出版领域包括侵权法、医疗事故、集体诉讼和民事司法。
Rachael Mulheron曾是民事司法委员会的成员，该委员会是该司法管辖区的民事司法法律改革机构，任期近十年。她参与了多个规则制定委员会的工作（包括2015年的集体诉讼制度），并在政府或司法部门的任命下，主持了多个法律改革工作组，涉及“交叉质询”、基本保险（BTE保险）和诉讼融资等问题。在从事学术事业之前，她曾在澳大利亚布里斯班担任律师，主要从事建筑法相关工作。2021年，她因在法律改革方面的贡献被任命为荣誉女王顾问，2024年当选为英国科学院院士。
